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Existing literature on cross-national variation in violence has paid little attention to the 
transnational transmission of crime. One such channel are the forced returns of migrants with 
a criminal record in their countries of temporary residence. Responding to this research gap, 
we study the effect of US deportations of convicts on levels of violent crime in deportees’ 
countries of origin for a cross-country panel of up to 123 countries covering the years 2003 to 
2015. We find a strong and robust effect of criminal deportations on homicide rates in 
countries of origin, that is to a large degree driven by deportations towards Latin America and 
the Caribbean. An additional inflow of ten deportees with a criminal history per 100,000 
increases expected homicide rates by more than two. In addition to controlling for country-
specific fixed effects, we provide evidence on a causal effect using an instrumental variable 
approach, that exploits spatial and time variation in migrant populations’ exposure to state 
level immigration policies in the US 
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“As the deportations [from the United States] have increased, so has crime, and the 
deportees are responsible for a disproportional amount of that…Many of the most 
violent offenses, like murder, kidnapping, and robbery, are committed by people who 
have been in the United States and are sent back here without any prior notice, with all 
the bad habits they developed there.” Carolos Ramires Landaverde, deputy director of 
the department of criminal investigation in El Salvador (cited in Rohter 1997) 
I. Introduction 
Worldwide, deaths from intentional homicides outstrip deaths resulting from war by a large 
margin.1 In 2015 the world saw five homicides per 100,000 persons; the continent of Africa 
experienced 13 homicides per 100,000 while Latin America had by far the largest number of 
homicides, with 23 homicides per 100,000 persons. While academic research on crime and 
internal violence has a long history, the magnitude of deaths from intentional homicide has 
led to a resurgence of interest in the topic amongst policymakers over the last five years.  
Homicides have been associated with broader patterns of social and political conflict: 
prolonged civil war and the endurance of failed states provide an institutional vacuum within 
which homicide rates have soared in African and Middle Eastern countries.  This surge in 
violence not only continues to destabilize regional governments but also contributes to the 
desire of individuals to emigrate out of that continent and into the European Union.  A similar 
story can be told about the legacy of civil conflict in the Northern Triangle of Central 
America: although civil wars in that region ended some two decades ago, those countries 
suffer from weak institutions and gang violence. Epidemic gang-related violence in Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador is widely understood to be a leading cause of the massive 
increase in the migration of unaccompanied minors to the southern border of the United States 
during the summer of 2014 (Clemens 2017; Renwick and Labrador 2018)  
How can we explain cross-national patterns of violence? There is already a relatively large 
literature on the determinants of crime and criminality in comparative perspective.2  To date, 
                                                
1 Author’s calculation using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In 
2015, worldwide, there were 670,285 battle deaths compared to 4,245,231 homicides.  These 
are huge increases compared to 2010 but the magnitude of difference remains: in 2010 there 
were 48,952 battle deaths compared to 373,038 homicides. 
2 See Koeppel, Rhineberger-Dunn and Mack (2015) for a recent and comprehensive review of 
this literature. 
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scholars have focused on a multitude of social, economic, political, and cultural 
characteristics of a country when hypothesizing about the cause(s) of violent crime.  We 
argue that these understandings, however, are incomplete because they ignore a transnational 
element: the role of returning criminals who have been deported from the United States back 
to their countries of origin. The idea that deportations from the United States are associated 
with an increase in violent crime in one’s homeland is not new.  The statement by 
Subcommissioner Ramirez that opens this paper has been echoed by numerous officials.  
Jamaica’s Prime Minister P.J. Patterson argued that “the thousands of criminal deportees, 
mainly from the United States have added fuel to unacceptable levels of crime: Many of these 
persons have lived in the United States for considerable periods, been part of criminal gangs 
and on their return to Jamaica, link up with counterpart criminal elements to continue their 
illegal activities from our shores” (quoted in Griffin 2002, 42). 
Viewing variation in cross-national levels of violence through the lens of deportation not only 
helps us understand the role of transnational factors and actors in influencing domestic 
behavior, it also adds to a growing literature on return migration.  Deportees unlike other 
returnees, it must be emphasized, are not returning home voluntarily.  Though, like other 
migrants who return home, they may bring home with them new ideas, norms, behaviors, and 
connections.3  Some of these connections may be in the form of transnational criminal gangs 
which foster the movement of weapons, drugs, and the trafficking of human beings (Dudley 
2012; Farah and Phillips Lum 2013).  
We hypothesize that forced return—deportations—from the United States will, all else equal, 
increase violence in the deportee’s homeland.  Our focus on the US as source of deportations 
is justified for two reasons. First, the US is the largest destination for migrants in the world, 
with a stock of undocumented migrants of estimated at approximately 11.2 million (Passel 
and Cohn 2016) and cumulated amount of 5.4 million deported migrants between 1996 and 
                                                
3 The literature on migrant transnationalism and “social remittances” finds that return 
migration is, for the most part, associated with positive political and social change in the 
home country (e.g. Spilimbergo 2009; Beine, Docquier, and Schiff 2013).  Our focus on 
deportees as a form of return migration is not intended to diminish these positive effects of 
migrant networks; rather it is to show that there may be a darker side to transnational ties. 
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2015. Of these, 2.4 million had a criminal record4 (US Department of Homeland Security 
Various Years). Second, the US has relatively high levels of violence with a homicide rate 
more than twice the average of the group of high income countries (4.9 compared to a high-
income country average of 2.2 per 100,000 according to World Development Indicators). The 
US is also the country with the highest per capita incarceration rates in the world (Walmsley 
2013).  
We face a fundamental challenge in our empirical work—that of the potential for 
endogeneity: Those who are deported from the United States are, by definition, migrants. And 
the very same push factors that lead people to leave their homes—lack of social and economic 
opportunities coupled with weak political institutions—are associated with crime.   
Deportations from the United States to country 𝑖, then, from an observational perspective, 
may be a future manifestation of violence in that country.  
To confront this challenge, we deploy an instrumental variables strategy.  In the baseline 
empirical model, we estimate the effect of annual per capita deportations from the US on per 
capita homicide rates in country 𝑖 for a panel consisting of up to 123 countries covering the 
years 2003 to 2015. Our instrumental variable strategy exploits both spatial and time variation 
in migrant populations’ exposure to US immigration policies as those policies vary across US 
states. Migrants who happen to live in US states with more restrictive immigration policies, 
all else equal, face a higher probability of being deported. Importantly, differences in the 
implementation of immigration policies across different US states are plausibly exogenous—
it is difficult to envision a situation where a US state alters it’s immigration policy with a 
view to the homicide rate in a foreign country.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II develops our argument and situates it 
in the broader literature. We then present the baseline model and data in section III, whereas 
section IV explains the instrumental variable approach. Section V presents results for the 
baseline model and section VI presents results for the instrumented regression. Both the 
instrumented and the baseline regression results show a strong and robust effect of criminal 
                                                
4 It is important to note that entering the United States illegally or overstaying one’s visa does 
not constitute a felony; these are misdemeanors. A criminal deportation hearing is initiated for 
a migrant—whether they are in the United States legally or illegally—if they have committed 
a felony; not all migrant felons are subject to deportation hearings. 
 5 
deportations on homicide rates in countries of origin: The deportation of an additional ten 
individuals with a criminal record per 100.000 persons in the homeland increases that 
country’s expected homicide rates by two to three per 100.000 persons. We show, as 
expected, that this effect is strongly driven by the sub-region of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Section VII concludes by discussing the important policy implications of these 
findings. 
II. Deportations, Return Migration, and Violence 
The literature on transnational social ties explores how migrants transmit norms, ideas, and 
information about their host country and community to friends and family back in their 
homelands.  Research in this area has found positive effects of what have been called 
“diaspora networks” on the spread of culture, the diffusion of knowledge, and the growth of 
foreign investment.  The literature on transnational networks, however, has difficulty 
distinguishing between norms and practices that are transmitted over long distances through 
visits, phone calls, and other temporary contacts as compared with those ideas and behaviors 
which a migrant brings to the homeland upon their return.  In part this difficulty stems from a 
lack of comprehensive and comparable data on return migration—countries rarely record 
when the foreign born leave their shores and home countries similarly exert little effort 
recording who returns. That said, the scattered evidence which does exist—collected 
primarily from surveys—speaks to the role that returnees play in promoting democracy (e.g. 
Barsbai et al. 2017), promoting female political incorporation (Lodigiani and Salomone 
2015), and spreading norms associated with family planning (e.g., Beine et al 2013).5    
The literature on the effects of involuntary returns is even more sparse. The only literature we 
are aware of is comprised of qualitative stories or single cases that document how 
deportations are related to violence in the homeland. For the case of Central America, 
hypotheses on the spread of violence via deportations are based on qualitative research (e.g. 
Lineberger 2011; Cruz 2013; Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson 2009; Zuñiga Nuñez 2016) 
and journalistic investigations (e.g. Arana 2005; Maslin 2017) which trace the epidemic of 
violence to the deportation of convicted gang members from the US since the mid 1990s.  
                                                
5 See Wahba (2014) and Rapoport (2018) for reviews of this literature. 
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While politicians—like Ramires Landaverde and Patterson quoted above—have argued that 
deportations lead the violent crime, this observation does rest upon strong analytical 
foundations.  Deportees may, all else equal, have difficulty reintegrating socially back in their 
homelands. Burt and Savignac (2016, 7) find the case of Honduras illustrative: “Deportees 
face even bleaker prospects, since, as the director of the Centro de Atención al Migrante 
Retornado (CAMR), told the authors in an interview, ‘Honduran society still rejects the 
Hondurans that are deported, thinking that they are criminals.’”  They continue: “Deportees 
may also be targeted by elements in the security forces. A researcher of San Diego State 
University has found evidence that those deported on criminal grounds are sometimes 
persecuted by the state.”    
Returnees—especially if they left their homelands due to civil conflict or economic crisis—
are returning to an environment where economic, political, and social opportunities are likely 
limited.  In some cases, gang membership provides those who return with a sense of 
community along with access to illicit economic opportunities (Dudley 2012). If incarcerated 
in the United States prior to deportation, the deportee may have been exposed to more intense 
criminal behavior which may alter their future behavior.6  Those incarcerated are also more 
likely to have developed connections with transnational organized crime (Farah and Phillips 
Lum 2013).  Finally, the literature on parole in the United States points to the existence of a 
“revolving door” whereby once released, criminal offenders who are incarcerated are more 
likely to commit crime once paroled than those who are sentenced to probation (e.g. Western 
2006). 
These conjectures have been subject to limited empirical study.  To our knowledge, Blake 
(2014) offers the only existing quantitative study on the links between deportation and 
violence in countries of origin. Relying on a cross-country panel of 34 advanced and 
developing countries over the period 1970 to 2004, he attributes a fourth of the increase in 
homicide rates in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s to the inflow of criminal 
deportees.  
                                                
6 Dr. Prem Misir, Pro-Chancellor of the University of Guyana, argues that, “…criminal 
deportees have been intensively socialized in the criminal fields in the U.S. These deportees 
are in full possession of their U.S. criminal tool kit” (cited in Headley 2015). 
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While a useful starting point, we extend Blake’s (2014) work in a number of important ways.  
First, we examine a much larger set of countries (123 versus 34) spanning a large universe of 
middle and low income countries through the year 2015.  Extending through 2015 is critical 
as this more recent period has been characterized by heightened rates of deportation from the 
United States. Second, we take the issue of causality seriously and generate a plausibly 
exogenous instrument that exploits variation in migrants’ exposure to immigration policies—
at the level of the US state—which helps us decrease the possibility that our estimates are 
biased as a result of simultaneity or reverse causality.  Finally, we embed our argument in a 
more comprehensive theoretical understanding of the causes of homicides7 which allows us to 
hold constant a broader set of variables that are related to cross-national patterns of violent 
crime.8 The next sections develop the empirical model and data used to test this hypothesis on 
a large panel of countries. 
                                                
7 This literature finds its analytical roots in two canonical models.  The first is Gary Becker’s 
decision-theoretic model of the economics of crime. Becker (1968) argues that crime rates 
depend not just on the risks and penalties associated with the probability of apprehension but 
also on the risk weighted gains from criminal behavior.  A second theory comes from 
sociological tradition and focuses on differences between in- and out-group behavior; 
between the haves and the have nots.  The key ideas here are derived from notions of relative 
deprivation and focus on inequality as social and economic inequality is seen to breed social 
conflict (e.g. Bourguignon 2000; Ehrlich 1973; Stack 1984). 
8 The cross-national empirical literature on the determinants of violent crime—especially 
homicides—is mixed with regard to the importance of inequality. While Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, and Loayza  (2002) find a statistically significant and positive effect of 
inequality—as measured by the gini coefficient—on cross-national homicide rates, Neumayer 
(2005) concludes that the statistical effect of inequality disappears once one controls for 
country fixed effects.  Neumayer (2005), like Chu and Tusalem (2013), find that homicides 
are positively correlated with political instability (measured as the transition from autocracy 
to democracy or via measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization) and human rights abuses.   
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III. The Deportation of Convicts and Homicide Rates in Countries of 
Origin: Data and Baseline Model 
This paper’s goal is to assess, empirically, whether the deportation of criminals from the US 
increases violence in that migrants’ country of origin. Cross-country comparisons of crime 
pose several methodological challenges. For one, different countries may apply different 
definitions for what constitutes a crime or how these crimes are to be punished. Even if 
definitions are the same, there are likely (significant) differences in reporting biases and 
detection rates across countries.  We expect the rate of unreported or undetected crime to 
differ greatly between countries and possibly also over time, depending on differences in legal 
systems (D’Amico and Williamson 2015) and state capacities. These observations inform our 
choice of dependent variable: while our argument applies to violent crime in general, we 
focus on homicide because homicide rates are the best observable and most comparable 
indicator of violent crime that suffers from the lowest bias in terms of reporting and 
definitions. Violent deaths are generally defined the same way across countries and over time. 
On the other hand, incidents of violent deaths are difficult to hide and should be subject to 
lower underreporting biases9.  
We utilize data from the United Nations’ Organization for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to 
measure homicide rates, defined as annual violent deaths per 100 thousand persons. This 
allows us to cover up to 123 countries for the years 2003 to 2015. As an alternative, we 
provide also results using homicide data from the World Health Organization (WHO) in the 
appendix. Although WHO data allows tracing homicide rates back to 1980 for some 
countries, fewer cases are covered (up to 112). Since our main focus of analysis lies on the 
years after 2003, we prefer UNODC over WHO data10. 
                                                
9 Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, the growth in prison population is negatively 
correlated with the growth in homicide rates. This could be due to measurement errors, or due 
to low clearance rates. 
10 We are also concerned about measurement errors in the WHO data, especially in earlier 
periods and for low and middle income countries. Since these are also the countries that 
received most deportees, this could produce biased coefficients. 
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Our explanatory variable of interest is annual deportations of criminals from the United 
States. Data on annual deportations by nationality of origin is available from The Homeland 
Security’s Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (various years) which provides statistics on the 
number of deportations of individuals with and without criminal convictions.  Figure 1 shows 
the total number of deportations from the US since the late 1970s. Removals intensified with 
passage of the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 
that expanded the categories of undocumented immigrants subject to deportation and made it 
more difficult for them to get relief from removal. Following the IIRIA act in 1996, any 
“alien” who served a longer-than-a-year sentence became subject to removal from the U.S. 
after completion of their prison term (Cruz 2013, 5)  
After a peak of more than 800 thousand annual deportations in 2013 (of these, more than 400 
thousand with a prior penal history), the total number of deportees has declined in recent 
years, coinciding with a lower number of new arrivals and higher rates of voluntary returns to 
countries such as Mexico (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). Over the entire period 
from 1978 to 2015, the total number of deported persons amounts to about 12.5 million, of 
these, 4.9 million had a penal record11. This compares to an estimated stock of undocumented 
migrants in the year 2014 of more than 11.2 million (Passel and Cohn 2016).  
 
[Figure 1: Total Deportations from the US] 
[Figure 2: Homicide Rates and Deportation Rates] 
 
Figure 2 plots average levels of annual deportations of convicts per 100,000 people in origin 
countries against average annual homicide rates per 100,000 persons for the period 2000 to 
2015, for 123 countries. The figure reveals that the relative importance of forced returns 
varies greatly the geographic origin of migrants, as do homicide rates. Many of the most 
violent countries are situated in Central America and the Caribbean, headed by Honduras 
                                                
11 It is possible that one and the same person has been deported multiple times after re-entry 
in the US. We are therefore not able to give a prices estimate on how large the cumulative 
number of deportees (excluding double-counts) is. 
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(67), El Salvador (61) and Jamaica (49). Peak years for homicide rates are even higher, 
reaching 108 in El Salvador and 93 in the gang-ridden countries El Salvador and Honduras. 
Regarding annual deportations of convicts, the countries which received the largest number of 
convicted returnees relative to home country population are Mexico, the Northern Triangle of 
Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala) as well as Belize and Jamaica. By 2015, 
the cumulated number of deported convicts in the most affected countries had reached 95 
thousand in El Salvador, 115 thousand in Honduras and > 1.7 million in Mexico. The 
cumulative number of deportees with a criminal background correspond to between 1.3% and 
1.5% of these countries’ population stocks in 2015. It is clearly conceivable that such as 
sizable number of convicted deportees could have affected violence at countries of origin, 
suggested not only by the correlation in Figure 2 but also by anecdotal and journalistic 
evidence from Central America . In the following, we explore whether these two factors—
deportations and homicides—are linked in a causal way.  
As a first step, we estimate the following baseline model: 
 
(1) 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒+,- = 𝛽0	𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒+,- + 𝛽7	𝑋+,- + 𝑣+, 
 
where	𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	are annual homicide rates for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 are annual convicted 
deportees per home country population received by country 𝑖. The time period 𝑡 refers to two-
year intervals. The main reason is that deportations may not necessarily have an immediate 
effect on rates of violence upon arrival. Instead, they may affect the outcome variable with a 
time lag. By using a panel of two-year intervals we allow for longer lags in the effect 
compared to annual data. Two-year intervals proved to be empirically strongest and allowed 
us to maintain a sufficient number of observation over time while at the same time providing 
some flexibility in the timing of the effect. Homicide rates and deportations are calculated 
over two-year means (i.e. as averages over the current and the preceding year). Results for 1 
and 3-year intervals are shown in the appendix.  
All regressions reported below control include a set of country fixed effects to account for 
unmeasured, or unobservable, factors that may influence both deportations and homicide 
rates.  A country’s history of civil conflict, for example, may have left that country with a 
stock of arms and a legacy of violence that may pose more fertile grounds for a posterior 
increase of homicide rates. Country fixed effects may also capture the propensity of a 
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domestic population to self-select into more marginalized neighborhoods due, for example, to 
cheaper housing costs. The existence of these neighborhoods may expose migrants and their 
children to higher levels of violence and crime which, in turn, would make them more 
vulnerable to criminal careers and posterior deportations. Country specific fixed effects may 
also capture slow moving institutional and cultural factors in a country that are difficult to 
observe but may, nonetheless, influence rates of interpersonal violence. 
In Equation 1, 𝑋 is a vector of time-varying control variables, that have been identified as 
potential predictors of cross-country variation in violence in the empirical literature.  
Following this literature, we include a number of variables: average socioeconomic status 
which we measure using both the log of per capita income and the country’s aggregate level 
of GDP growth.  Income is an imperfect measure of development so we also include the 
average level of education measured as the average years of schooling of the adult population. 
These variables assume that changes in homicide rates are potentially related to levels of 
economic and human development. We include the Gini index as a measure of income 
inequality, because we expect countries with large income differentials to suffer from higher 
levels of social conflict and violence, For a similar reason, a dummy variable measures 
whether countries where in a civil war during the period in question. As demographic 
indicators, we also include the log of population size, the share of population under the age of 
14, and the share of the population living in urban areas (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza 2002; Neumayer 2005; Chu and Tusalem 2013 as cited above).  
Regarding policy variables, we control for how democratic a country is, ranging from most 
authoritarian (-10) to most democratic (10) and include an integrated measure of corruption 
taken from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators; this measure captures the perception of 
government corruption in a country. Small arms imports from the US (measured as per capita 
units) to each country 𝑖 controls for alternative potential channels that could affect homicide 
rates. We also add remittances received relative to home country GDP as an indicator for 
country’s dependence on out migration.   
Finally, we include an indicator of the exposure of the diaspora’s—their migrant population 
living in the United States-- average exposure to crime in the United States in order to control 
for the potential that the diaspora is transmitting norms or practices regarding violence back to 
their homeland.  To this end, we measure annual violent crimes per capita at the US state 
level and then weigh state-level crime rates by the distribution of the foreign born population 
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from each origin country 𝑖 in each US state 𝑗. See Appendix Table 1 for descriptive statistics 
and sources of all variables. 
Although deportations from the US can be traced back to 1978, our empirical analysis focuses 
principally on the period 2003 to 2015, for several reasons. For one, deportation rates from 
the US actually became quantitatively important only in the mid 1990s, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. Second, our analysis is limited by the availability and quality of the dependent as 
well as of control variables. In order to limit the chance that our inferences are influenced by 
poor measurement and noncomparable country samples, we focus on the most recent decades.  
Finally, the instrumental variable strategy developed below relies on information available for 
the period after 2000 only. We therefore focus our analysis on the period from 2003 to 2015. 
Results based on WHO data are provided in the appendix. 
IV. Identification Strategy: Using State-Level Variation in Immigration 
Policies as a Source of Exogenous Variation  
We are interested in estimating a causal effect of deportations from the United States on 
homicide rates in the deportee’s country of origin. In spite of including country fixed effects 
in equation (1), a causal interpretation of the coefficient on deportation rate would be 
problematic under certain conditions. On the one hand, we may observe reverse causality, for 
example when an increase in violence in countries of origin also triggers higher rates of 
emigration that might in turn may lead to higher deportation rates. Others might argue that a 
rise in violence at origin could be reflected in different migrant characteristics or a different 
behavior of migrants, that would make them more prone to engaging in criminal activities. In 
both cases, sceptics might claim that an increase in origin countries’ rates of violence could 
translate into a higher number of deportations, with causality running from a growth in 
violence at origin to a growth in deportation rates. A second concern with equation (1) relates 
to the potential for omitted variable bias.  Both deportations and origin countries’ rates of 
violence might respond to a third omitted variable we are not able to observe. For example, 
networks of transnational crime—which are directly unobservable from a quantitative 
perspective—may affect levels of violence in both the countries of origin and the country of 
residence. In this case deportations and violence at in the country of origin could move in 
parallel without being related in a causal way.  
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To address these concerns, we use an instrumental variables approach to estimate equation (1) 
via two-stage least squares. Our instrument exploits spatial variation in immigration policies 
across US states as a source of exogenous variation that explains variation in deportation rates 
by country of origin, but is not (directly) related to changes in violence at countries of origin. 
The rationale for the instrumental strategy is as follows: While the US Constitution charges 
the federal government with the creation of laws governing who can enter the United States 
and requirements for when foreigners can become citizens, individual states have the legal 
right to determine when and how non-citizens can participate in the labor market, when they, 
when they can attend local schools, and the conditions under which they can obtain local 
services.  We argue that when migrants—regardless of status—live in states that employ a 
tougher stance with respect to undocumented migrants they are more likely to be deported 
upon the commission of a felony.  The toughness of the state’s stance regarding migrants 
should be correlated with the US’s aggregate deportation rate but, at the same time, should 
not directly influence the homicide rate in the migrant’s country of origin other than through 
the deportation rate.   
We measure the toughness of a state’s immigration policy with three binary variables. First, 
we use an indicator for whether states participated in Secure Communities, a federal data-
sharing program through which fingerprints submitted by local law enforcement agencies to 
the FBI are shared with immigration enforcement agencies for checks against immigration 
databases. Depending on the result, immigration officials decide whether to take enforcement 
action, like issuing a detainer request. A second indicator reports whether states had a policy 
to mandate that some or all employers use E-Verify, an electronic verification system that 
confirms the employment eligibility of workers and therefore excludes undocumented 
migrants from formal labor markets. Third, we use an indicator for whether each state 
provides prenatal care, regardless of a woman’s migratory status, through either a state-
funded program or through a 2002 Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) option. All 
three indicators are taken from Gelatt, Bernstein and Koball (2018) and cover the years 2000 
to 201612.  
                                                
12 Among a larger set of policies targeted towards undocumented immigrants, these three 
proved to be the strongest predictors for deportation rates. Other possible variables include 
access to education for undocumented migrants, different health and social benefits, and 
different forms of cooperation in terms of immigration enforcement policies. See Gelatt, 
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Each of the instrumental variable varies by groups of immigrants 𝑖 according to their 
exposure to immigration policies at the state level. We obtain a different indicator for each 
immigrant group 𝑖 by weighting the state-level indicator on immigration policies with 
immigrant group’s share of migrants living in US state 𝑗. Note that all annual variation in the 
instrumental variable is attributed to period-to-period changes in immigration policies at the 
level of US states. The spatial distribution of migrants refers to cross-sectional distribution of 
the foreign-born population extracted from the American Community Survey for the years 
2005-2009 (US Census Bureau 2011). Due to the importance of networks to reduce costs of 
migration, migration routes tend to develop along specific corridors that are very stable over 
time (McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). Variation in migration corridors and, as a result, 
different exposures to conditions in migrants’ countries of residence has frequently been used 
by migration researchers as a source of exogenous variation in instrumental strategies (e.g. 
Yang 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Ambrosius and Cuecuecha 2016; Anzoategui, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 2014). 
The first stage instrumental regression can be formulated as follows: 
 
(2) 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒+,- = 𝛽0𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒+,-B0 + 𝛽7	𝑋+,- + 𝑣+, 
 
As in eq. (1) above, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	are deportations for each country 𝑖 relative to the 
population size of the country of origin. 	𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 refers to three instrumental 
variables as described above. To ensure that the instruments precede deportations and are not 
themselves affected by deportation rates, we use the lagged values of the instrument in t − 1. 𝑋 refers to the same vector of control variables as explained above, and 𝜈 is the set of country 
fixed effects. In the second stage regression, we replace 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	with the estimated 
values 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝚤𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 as obtained from eq. 2; this provides us with estimates of the 
country- and time-specific deportation rate which are uncorrelated with homicide rates in the 
                                                
Bernstein and Koball (2018) for details and an overview of other state-level immigration 
policies (URL: https://urbn.is/2vLfY5Z). 
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deportee’s homeland. This enables us to obtain a causal estimate of the effect of deportation 
on homicide rates.   
The validity of our instrument rests on two assumptions. First, the instrument has to be 
relevant, i.e. state-level variation in deportation policies has to be a sufficiently strong 
predictor for the deportation of convicts. We expect countries whose expatriates live in US 
states with more hostile immigration policies to suffer from much larger threats of 
deportation. This assumption will be tested formally below. 
Second, the instrument has to be excludable, i.e. state-level variation in deportation policies 
should be exogenous and not (directly) related to violence in countries of origin. Although 
this assumption cannot be formally tested, it should hold as long as state-level variation in 
deportation policies does not respond to migrants’ behavior or changes in rates of violence in 
countries of origin, for example because states respond to a surge in criminal engagement of 
specific migrant populations that are concentrated in their jurisdictions. In order to ensure that 
the effect is not driven by migrants’ characteristics, regressions include controls for social, 
economic and demographic characteristics of countries of origin. The vector of control 
variables in 𝑋 also includes an indicator for the average exposure to state-level violent crime 
of the migrant population. This assures that results are not driven by higher levels of crime at 
migrants’ places of residence. Moreover, we use lagged values of the instruments. Lagging 
instruments by one period ensures that homicide rates and subnational variation in deportation 
policies do not respond to unobserved simultaneous events in t=1 or the possibility that 
deportation policies respond to current rates of violence in countries of origin. Together with 
country fixed effects, state-level variation in US immigration policies should provide a strong 
and exogenous instrument: there is no reason to believe that regional variation in immigration 
policies bears any direct effect on the origin countries’ homicide rates in the following period, 
other than through the deportation of convicts. 
V. Effects of Deportations on Violence: Results from Panel Data 
Analysis 
Before turning to the instrumental variables analysis, in Table 1 we present five different 
empirical specifications corresponding to equation (1).  All of the specifications use country 
as well as time fixed effects, hence controlling for time-invariant country characteristics and 
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eventual time trends in the variables. As mentioned above, the panel uses two year intervals 
on mean values, both for homicide rates and deportation rates. 
The first column in Table 1 shows result for convicts’ deportations without additional 
controls. The second column adds additional time-varying controls as discussed above. The 
third column adds the rate of non-criminal deportations. The fifth to seventh column repeat 
column two’s specification on three subsets: Column 5 assess whether these results hold when 
excluding deportees to high income OECD countries from the sample. Although this group of 
countries can be seen as a control group that increases the number of observations, 
deportation rates are actually negligible for high-income countries. Hence, we do not expect 
deportations to have any measurable effect on origin country violence for this group. The last 
column repeats regression for the subset of Latin American and Caribbean countries. We 
expect results to be largely driven by migrants from the Latin American subcontinent: The 
Diaspora especially from Central America and the Caribbean is to a large degree concentrated 
in the US, and the Latin American and Caribbean region also suffered from the highest 
deportation rates. Moreover, Latin America constitutes a more homogenous group of 
countries compared to the rest of the world. This allows us to assess the effects of deportation 
rates on a group of countries that is relatively homogeneous both in terms of colonial and 
historical legacies of covariates we might not be able to fully observe. Column seven excludes 
Latin America from the sample. 
Few of the control variables in Table 2 show a strong and statistically significant pattern. 
Larger population sizes are associated with higher homicide rates. Higher rates of schooling 
are associated with lower homicide rates. Countries with a younger population structure tend 
to report higher homicide rates, although this demographic indicator is statistically significant 
only for the subset of Latin America. It is noteworthy that migrants’ exposure to crime at 
destination is, if anything, negatively related to homicide rates at origin. This supports our 
view that it is deportations rather than a shared trend in violence at places of residence and 
origin that explains our findings. Interestingly, arms exports from the US are related to lower, 
not higher homicide rates, but is statistically significant only for the Latin American subset.  
The deportation of convicts has a strong and consistent positive effect on homicide rates in 
countries of origin in all specifications, with a coefficient that ranges between .18 and .27 in 
specifications 2 to 6, and a somewhat lower coefficient in the first column without any control 
variables. We do not observe the same effect for deportation rates of non-convicts. In column 
3, this variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero while the criminal deportation rate 
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continues to be statistically significant and positive. This suggests that it is not deportations 
per se that are driving homicides; rather criminal history of the individual deported is driving 
homicides. Column 4 provides additional support for this conjecture as the non-criminal 
deportation rate continues to be statistically insignificant even after dropping the criminal 
deportation rate.   
Results from Table 1 imply that an inflow of ten additional deportees with a criminal record 
per 100 thousand people increases expected homicide rates by roughly two. Put differently, a 
one standard deviation increase in the 2012 deportation rates (» 24) is associated with an 
increase in homicide rates of » 4.3 per 100 thousand, based on the point estimate in column 2 
(24 * .18 » 4.3). For Honduras, the country with the highest deportation rate (»162) as well as 
the highest homicide rates (» 93 per 100 thousand) in 2012, the point estimate assigns roughly 
a third of its predicted homicides to forced deportations of convicts (162 * .18 » 29, 
corresponding to » 30% of its 2012 homicide rate).  
Coefficients are similar in size and statistical significance for the subset excluding high 
income OECD countries as well as for the much smaller subset of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. However, when excluding Latin America, the effect vanishes (column 
seven). This supports our expectation that the observed effect is to a large degree driven by 
experiences of the Latin American subcontinent that provides the largest variation in terms of 
homicide rates as well as deportation rates.  
 
[Table 1: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates] 
 
VI. Instrumental Variables Model 
A causal interpretation of coefficients in Table 1 could be questioned on several grounds: 
violence may give rise to a surge in out-migration (e.g., Clemens 2017) which may, in turn, 
give rise to an increased border security in the United States, a strategy which may include 
increased deportation rates. Or, it may be the case that both US immigration policy and 
violence in a country of origin may be responding to a third, unobserved factor such as the 
growth of transnational organized crime.    
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We confront these potential challenges to inference via an instrumental variables strategy 
using two-stage least squares.  We argue that that migrants’ exposure to state-level variation 
in immigration policies provide a source of exogenous variation that is correlated with 
criminal deportation rates. As discussed above, we use three instrumental variables to capture 
the exposure of migrants to immigration policies along three dimensions: Whether states 
participated in the data-sharing program “Secure Communities”, whether private or public 
employers had to use “E-verify” to check employment eligibility, and whether child and 
health care benefits extended to undocumented pregnant women. Each country’s diaspora in 
the United States—measured in terms of the size of the foreign born population from country 
i residing in the United States at time t—is weighted by its exposure to these state-level 
immigration policies.  
Table 2 provides results for the first stage model. The instrument of lagged immigration 
policies has strong joint and individual effects on criminal deportation rates. F-statistics (Chi 
square) for their joint significance are above 20 in all specifications (see test statistics in Table 
3) which is above the benchmark critical value for weak instruments (Stock and Yogo 2002). 
The instrumental variable “secure communities” reflects the enforcement of a policy that is 
directly targeted towards undocumented migrants who have broken the law. The instrument is 
positive and statistically significant: Migrant communities exposed to the enforcement of the 
policy face higher deportation rates of convicts. Interestingly, the other two instruments that 
are targeted towards labor markets (E-verify) and benefits for undocumented pregnant 
immigrants (prenatal care) seem to operate in a different way: Exposure to more restricted 
labor market has a negative effect on convicts’ deportation rates, whereas more generous 
benefits for pregnancy and pre-natal care are associated with higher rates of convicts’ 
deportations. One explanation for the latter results is that the enforcement of deportations, the 
exclusion from labor markets and the extension of social benefits could pose trade-offs for 
policymakers: A more generous stance in labor markets and social policies could be justified 
by a strict application of “zero tolerance” deportation policies to those who have committed 
crimes. 
As above, all specifications maintain year and time fixed effects, hence all coefficients are 
estimated from within-country variation (i.e. changes in deportation rates over time). Control 
variables from the first-step regression indicate that migrants from countries that are poorer, 
smaller, more unequal and have a younger age structure experience more deportations. As 
expected, migrants that are exposed to higher levels of violent crime at their place of 
residence also experience higher deportation rates. In line with expectations, migrants from 
 19 
countries that are characterized by more precarious conditions are also deported at higher 
rates.  
Results from the 2nd stage regression in Table 3 repeat regressions from the previous section 
but replace the variable 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 with predicted values 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝚤𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 from 
first step regressions in Table 2. The instrumental variables models provide surprisingly 
consistent and robust results: All instrumented point estimates for the rate of deported 
convicts lie in the range between .23 and .3, a slightly larger effect compared to the un-
instrumented regressions results. In fact, a Wu-Hausman-test on the coefficient for 
deportations does not reject the null-hypothesis of endogeneity (i.e. there is no sign that 
coefficients in the instrumented regressions are significantly different from the 
uninstrumented coefficients). The signs of control variables are similar to those in Table 2 
with only minor differences in terms of size and statistical significance. As in Table 2, results 
hold for the subsets excluding high income OECD countries and for the sample of just Latin 
American countries13. In sum, the use of a lagged instrumental variable together with country 
fixed effects and a large number of control variables confirms the existence of a strong causal 
relationship between the deportation of convicts and homicide rates in countries that receive 
deportees. The Sargan over-identification test is not rejected, confirming the validity of the 
instruments (i.e. all three instruments are exogenous and uncorrelated with the model 
residuals). Instrumented results are robust to the use of different indicators, samples and 
intervals. The table in Annex 2 uses data from WHO instead of UNODC data on homicides 
for a smaller cross-sectional sample. Findings are robust to the use of alternative data. Tables 
in Annex 3 and 4 use one and three-year intervals instead of two-year intervals. Whereas 
some of the coefficients lose statistical significance when using three-year intervals, the main 
message remains unaltered. 
 
[Table 2: Effect of Exposure to State-Level Immigration Policies on Convicts’ Deportations 
from the US (1st Step Instrumental Regression)] 
 
                                                
13 We do not show results for the subset excluding Latin America and the Caribbean (as 
column seven in Table 1), because the instrument is too weak when excluding the Latin 
American sub-region. 
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[Table 3: Instrumented (2nd Step) Regression: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on 
Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates]  
VII. Conclusions 
We examine the effect of return migration on crime in the returnee’s home country.  Focusing 
on the effect of returning criminals who have been deported from the United States, we 
observe a strong and robust effect of criminal deportations on violence in migrants’ countries 
of origin. The causal effect is striking: for every ten deportees per 100,000 persons, we 
observe an increase of homicide rates by more than two. These results are to a large degree 
driven by Latin America and the Caribbean, the region with the largest variation and the 
largest levels both in deportation inflows and homicide rates. Using an instrumental variable 
approach where we use the exposure of migrant populations to variation in immigration 
policies as an exogenous source of variation backs the causal interpretation of our results. 
These empirical findings have several important implications. First, our study emphasizes the 
transnational roots of violence; roots that have largely been neglected in the quantitative 
empirical literature. Second, it highlights one channel through which emigration may produce 
negative long-term social outcomes at origin. Most importantly, the findings carry strong 
policy implications. The deportation of convicts bears huge follow-up costs for countries 
receiving deportees. These countries generally provide few perspectives for returnees in terms 
of social and economic reintegration and lack adequate institutions and resources to respond 
to imported violence. Last but not least, deportation policies tend to provoke new emigration. 
Violence in Central America -  that our empirical model at least partly attributed to 
deportations from the US - have led to a new wave of immigration to the US, particularly of 
unaccompanied minors (Clemens 2017; Renwick and Labrador 2018)  
Recently, forced returns have been applied to migrants from Islamic countries in Europe and 
elsewhere that have been suspect of constituting terrorist threats.	One limitation of our study 
is that we are able to estimate effects of criminal deportations from the US only, whereas data 
restrictions do not allow us to assess the effect of deportations along other migration 
corridors. Even so, our results should also be read as a warning against the possible 





Figure 1: Annual Deportations from the US (Total and Deportees with Penal Record) 
 
Annual deportations based on data from US Department of Homeland 
Statistics, Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics (various years) 
 
 
Figure 2: Homicide Rates and Deportation Rates 
 
Homicide rates and deportations rates per 100,000, based on data from 
United Nations Organization for Drugs and Crime and US Department of 
Homeland Security 
  
























































































































































Table 1: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates 
	
 
 homicide rate 		
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
deportation rate (convicts) 0.15** 0.18** 0.23**  0.19** 0.27*** -1.1 
[2.34] [2.33] [2.12]  [2.55] [3.46] [-0.89] 
deportation rate (non conv.)   -0.058 0.018    
  [-1.22] [1.06]    
civil war  -1.5 -1.1 -0.18 -0.78  0.22 
 [-1.57] [-1.25] [-0.19] [-0.63]  [0.45] 
corruption  -0.37 -0.26 -0.3 -0.46 -0.56 -0.027 
 [-0.72] [-0.51] [-0.53] [-0.41] [-0.3] [-0.12] 
migrants' exposure US 
crime 
 -0.041 -0.032 -0.063 -0.06 -0.14** 0.041 
 [-1.41] [-1.23] [-1.36] [-1.55] [-2.44] [1.22] 
GDP growth  1.3 0.49 -5.7 4.6 11 -0.0072 
 [0.58] [0.23] [-1.38] [0.97] [0.69] [-0.36] 
GDP per capita  -0.035 -0.022 0.0079 -0.11 -0.32* -0.93 
 [-0.61] [-0.4] [0.16] [-1.15] [-1.67] [-0.5] 
gini  (market)  0.16 0.054 0.0028 0.31 0.77 0.17* 
 [0.94] [0.35] [0.02] [0.88] [1.53] [1.94] 
polity  0.023 -0.0092 0.048 0.1 0.4 0.17 
 [0.24] [-0.12] [0.56] [0.89] [1.23] [1.58] 
population (log)  10 11** 6.5 15 26 3.9 
 [1.51] [1.95] [1.34] [1.64] [0.47] [0.92] 
remittances  -0.34 -0.026 -0.38 -0.41 -1 -0.18 
 [-0.61] [-0.1] [-0.77] [-0.69] [-0.95] [-1.55] 
schooling  -0.56 -0.72* -0.88 -1.4** -1.4** -0.051 
 [-1.36] [-1.8] [-1.65] [-2.46] [-2.54] [-0.69] 
share population < 14  0.81 0.69 -0.35 0.8 5.3*** -0.28 
 [1.52] [1.45] [-0.54] [1.12] [2.84] [-1.28] 
urban  0.21 0.31 0.41 0.24 0.56 -0.13 
 [0.93] [1.41] [1.47] [0.6] [1.05] [-0.76] 
US arms imports  -1.50E-04 1.60E-04 -0.0001 -0.022 -0.026* -0.0004 
 [-0.34] [0.41] [-0.17] [-1.46] [-1.79] [-1.42] 







country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.16 0.3 0.35 0.14 0.36 0.48 0.28 
F-stat 15.29 5.87 6.37 1.98 3.87 2.83 3.88 
#obs 608 358 337 337 198 93 265 
periods (max) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
countries 123 78 78 78 50 21 57 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on ordinary least squares 
regressions with country and year fixed effects for 2-year intervals. Stars denote significance at the 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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Table 2: Effect of Exposure to State-Level Immigration Policies on Convicts’ 
Deportations from the US (1st Step Instrumental Regression)  
	
 
deportation rate (convicts) 
  Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4 Spec.5 
secure communities (lagged) 9* 19* 16* 21 23 
[1.94] [1.7] [1.71] [1.22] [1.21] 
e-verify (lagged) -9.4 -57*** -31** -52** -48** 
[-1.03] [-2.8] [-2.25] [-2.5] [-2.49] 
prenatal care (lagged) 52* 150*** 110*** 200*** 270*** 
[1.95] [3.28] [2.81] [3.95] [4.97] 
deportations (non convicts)   0.35***   
  [12.08]   
civil war  6.7 2.5 8.2  
 [1.47] [0.89] [1.46]  
corruption  -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.9 
 [-1.2] [-1.59] [-0.51] [-0.71] 
migrants' exposure US crime  0.0028 -0.0029 0.098 0.39*** 
 [0.04] [-0.06] [0.99] [3.52] 
GDP growth  -0.0082 0.028 0.13 0.38 
 [-0.09] [0.5] [1.23] [1.65] 
GDP per capita  -29*** -17*** -43*** -65*** 
 [-2.78] [-2.7] [-3.34] [-3.03] 
gini  (market)  -1.2 -0.64 -1.4 -2.9* 
 [-1.54] [-1.57] [-1.33] [-1.73] 
polity  -0.032 0.018 -0.21 0.85 
 [-0.07] [0.07] [-0.41] [0.6] 
population (log)  -19 -23* -51* -53 
 [-0.83] [-1.75] [-1.91] [-0.36] 
remittances  1.2** -0.45 1** 2.1*** 
 [2.19] [-1.25] [2.13] [3.65] 
schooling  0.56 0.062 0.6 2.5 
 [0.87] [0.15] [0.41] [1.63] 
share population < 14  -3.8*** -2.1*** -4*** -7.8*** 
 [-3.04] [-2.76] [-2.76] [-2.57] 
urban  0.23 0.17 0.21 1 
 [0.48] [0.59] [0.3] [0.71] 
US arms imports  0.00075 -0.00034 -0.062* -0.039 
 [0.32] [-0.32] [-1.77] [-1.05] 
sample full full full w/o 
OECD 
Lat. Am & 
Caribbean 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.08 0.47 0.72 0.56 0.77 
F-stat 7.47 14.17 36.82 11.01 13.89 
#obs 868 458 430 264 129 
periods (max) 7 7 7 7 7 
countries 126 81 81 53 22 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on ordinary least 
squares regressions with country and year fixed effects for 2-year intervals. Stars denote 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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Table 3: Instrumented (2nd Step) Regression: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on 
Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates 
	 homicide rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
deportation rate (convicts) 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.3*** 
[3.14] [3.04] [2.73] [2.91] [4.77] 
deportation rate (non conv.)   -0.07   
  [-1.55]   
civil war (=1)  -1.9* -1.2 -0.96  
 [-1.66] [-1.26] [-0.74]  
corruption  -0.38 -0.26 -0.47 -0.56 
 [-0.7] [-0.5] [-0.41] [-0.3] 
exposure US crime  -0.034 -0.027 -0.059 -0.14** 
 [-1.18] [-1.03] [-1.55] [-2.45] 
GDP growth  3.5 1.4 5.7 14 
 [1.06] [0.54] [1.14] [1.01] 
GDP per capita  -0.044 -0.026 -0.12 -0.32* 
 [-0.74] [-0.49] [-1.21] [-1.74] 
gini (market)  0.21 0.062 0.33 0.85 
 [1.07] [0.39] [0.91] [1.64] 
polity  0.013 -0.018 0.1 0.31 
 [0.11] [-0.2] [0.85] [0.88] 
population (log)  11 11** 16 24 
 [1.38] [2.01] [1.64] [0.42] 
remittances  -0.33 0.027 -0.41 -1.1 
 [-0.57] [0.1] [-0.68] [-1.01] 
schooling  -0.55 -0.69* -1.3** -1.4** 
 [-1.39] [-1.81] [-2.42] [-2.48] 
share population < 14  1.2* 0.85 0.95 5.7*** 
 [1.87] [1.63] [1.2] [2.74] 
urban  0.17 0.3 0.22 0.48 
 [0.75] [1.32] [0.53] [0.85] 
US arms imports  -0.00018 0.0002 -0.02 -0.023 
 [-0.41] [0.53] [-1.36] [-1.63] 
sample full full full w/o OECD Lat. Am & 
Caribbean 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.16 0.29 0.35 0.36 0.48 
weak instr. F-test 26.69 26.27 26.05 21.39 21.39 
Wu Hausman 0.03 0.14 0.44 0.82 0.82 
Sargan 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
#obs 568 358 337 198 93 
periods (max) 6 6 6 6 6 
countries 113 78 78 50 21 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects for 2-year intervals. Stars denote significance at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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Annual inflow of deported persons from the US with a penal record, 





Annual inflow of deported persons from the US without a penal record, 





Homicides per 100,000 persons, according to data of the World Health 






Homicides per 100,000 persons, according to data of the United 
Nations Organization for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), covering the 
years 2013 to 2015. Two-year rolling means c) 
8.73 614 
[13.07]  




corruption A composite measure of corruption within the political system 
considered a threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic 
and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into 






Average exposure of migrant population from country i to violent 
crime known to police, including murder & non-negligent 
manslaughter, legacy rape, revised rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault at the level of US states. Average exposure is calculated from 
the distribution of the foreign born population across US states 
according to the 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) 2005 to 




GDP growth Per capita annual GDP growth f) 4.39 891 
[4.74]  
GDP per capita Per capita GDP in constant 2010 USD (logs) f) 8.47 889 
[1.45]  
gini (market) Gini indicator based on market income g) 45.67 729 
[6.21]  
polity Regime type indicator, ranging from most authoritarian (-10) to most 
democratic (+10) j) 
4.38 765 
[5.99]  
remittances Migrants' remittances as share of GDP f) 4.92 823 
[6.91]  




Share of the population under the age of 14 f) 28.94 875 
[10.90]  
urban Share of the urban population. Yearly values interpolated from 




US arms imports Import of non-military arms from the US, as units per 100,000 of home 
country population m) 
44.59 571 
[133.39] 





Instrumental variable, weighting the foreign born population from 
country i that lived in US states that operated the program "Secure 
Communities". Secure Communities is a federal data-sharing program 
that ran from 2008 to 2014 and was reinstated in January 2017. State 
participation was initially voluntary but later became mandatory and 
was active in all states by 2012. Through Secure Communities, 
fingerprints submitted by local law enforcement agencies to the FBI 
are shared with immigration enforcement agencies for checks against 
immigration databases. Depending on the result, immigration officials 
decide whether to take enforcement action, like issuing a detainer 




e-verify (lagged) Instrumental variable, weighting the foreign born population from 
country i that lived in US states that operated the program "e-verify". 
E-verify is an electronic verification system that confirms the 
employment eligibility of workers. Most states with this mandate 
require either public employers  and state contractors, or all employers 
with at least a certain number of employees, to use E-Verify. Takes the 
value 1 in states where employers are mandated to use E-Verify for 
some hires and takes the value 2 in states where E-Verify was 






Instrumental variable, weighting the foreign born population from 
country i that lived in US states that provided prenatal care, regardless 
of a woman's residency status, through either a state-funded program or 
through a 2002 CHIP (Children's Health Insurance Program) option. 




Mean values, standard deviations in brackets and the number of observations are provided for the two-year 
intervals between 2003 and 2015. Sources: a) US Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics. Various Years (URL: https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook) b) World Health 
Organization (WHO). Historical trend series data on deaths from road traffic accidents, suicide and homicide 
(URL: http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/surveillance/databases/mortality/en/) c) United Nations 
Organization on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Data series on homicide and other criminal offences (URL: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics.html) d) Sarkees and Wayman (2010)e) International 
Country Risk Guide.  The PRS Group (URL:  https://www.prsgroup.com/) f) World Development Indicators 
Online Database g) Solt (2016) h) US Department of Justice-Federal Bureau of Investigation, via US Census 
Bureau (2017) i) American Community 5-Year Survey 2005 – 2009  j) Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research (INSCR), Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016 k) Barro and 
Lee (2001) l)  United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects 2017 (URL: 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/) m) United Nations COMTRADE Database (URL: https://comtrade.un.org/data/) n) 
Gelatt et al. (2018). Original sources for the three indicators on state-level migration policies are Medical 
Assistance Programs for Immigrants in Various States, National Immigration Law Center, Issues: Health Care, 
2002, 2005–07, 2009–12, 2014–16, for health benefits; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) Library: Secure Communities Nationwide Interoperability Statistics (FY 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and YTD FY 2015) for Secure Communities; and National Conference of State 
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Annex 2: Instrumented (2nd Step) Regression: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on 
Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates (WHO data) 
	 homicide rates (WHO) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
deportation rate (convicts) 0.096 0.16** 0.19** 0.16** 0.21*** 
[1.19] [2.17] [2.14] [2.26] [3.23] 
deportation rate (non conv.)   -0.0033   
  [-0.13]   
corruption  0.15 0.23 0.44 0.21 
 [0.3] [0.42] [0.39] [0.19] 
exposure US crime  0.019 0.029 -0.0068 0.024 
 [0.47] [0.74] [-0.16] [0.45] 
GDP growth  0.035 0.011 0.05 -0.013 
 [0.81] [0.22] [0.75] [-0.09] 
GDP per capita  3 6.1 5.6 14 
 [0.59] [1.15] [0.88] [1.42] 
gini (market)  0.17 0.2 0.23 0.26 
 [1.06] [1.26] [0.74] [0.47] 
polity  -0.11 -0.13 -0.078 -0.44 
 [-0.81] [-0.84] [-0.56] [-1.21] 
population (log)  8.4 5.2 4.7 -14 
 [1.43] [0.91] [0.41] [-0.62] 
remittances  0.54* 0.66** 0.73** 0.98 
 [1.85] [2.09] [2.01] [1.57] 
schooling  -0.76 -0.75 -1.6 -2.1* 
 [-1.35] [-1.37] [-1.52] [-1.83] 
share population < 14  0.62 0.65 1 1.7* 
 [0.94] [1.01] [1.19] [1.71] 
urban  0.58** 0.57** 1.3*** 1.1 
 [2.35] [2.38] [2.71] [1.35] 
US arms imports  1.20E-04 2.60E-04 -0.022* -0.027 
 [0.35] [0.73] [-1.65] [-1.29] 
sample full full full w/o OECD Lat. Am & 
Caribbean 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.27 0.33 
weak instr. F-test 21.54 26.58 32.81 37.64 31.76 
Wu Hausman 0.68 0.29 0.03 0.1 0.07 
Sargan 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
#obs 515 347 322 169 112 
periods (max) 7 7 7 7 7 
countries 90 65 65 37 22 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects for 2-year intervals. Stars denote significance at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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Annex 3: Instrumented (2nd Step) Regression: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on 
Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates (UNOC data, yearly intervals) 
  
homicide rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
deportation rate (convicts) 0.23*** 0.23* 0.28* 0.23** 0.32*** 
[2.59] [1.8] [1.82] [1.97] [2.91] 
deportation rate (non conv.)   -0.072   
  [-1.35]   
civil war (=1)  -1.9 -1.4 -1.5  
 [-1.47] [-1.16] [-1.03]  
corruption  -0.24 -0.16 -0.54 -0.14 
 [-0.43] [-0.27] [-0.47] [-0.07] 
exposure US crime  -0.033 -0.018 -0.07* -0.14** 
 [-1.13] [-0.59] [-1.69] [-2.21] 
GDP growth  -0.058 -0.042 -0.11 -0.31 
 [-1.43] [-1.17] [-1.54] [-1.65] 
GDP per capita  4.2 3.7 6.9 20 
 [1.01] [0.92] [1.07] [1.16] 
gini (market)  0.26 0.17 0.46 1.2* 
 [1.22] [0.89] [1.25] [1.83] 
polity  -0.075 -0.1 -0.0075 -0.29 
 [-0.49] [-0.74] [-0.05] [-0.83] 
population (log)  13 14** 20** 55 
 [1.65] [2.18] [2.08] [0.83] 
remittances  -0.32 0.016 -0.34 -1.3 
 [-0.65] [0.07] [-0.64] [-1.4] 
schooling  -0.53 -0.6 -1.2** -1.3** 
 [-1.35] [-1.61] [-1.95] [-2.04] 
share population < 14  1.2* 1.1* 1.5 6.5*** 
 [1.72] [1.67] [1.62] [3.29] 
urban  0.16 0.22 0.17 -0.18 
 [0.65] [0.89] [0.36] [-0.29] 
US arms imports  -3.80E-05 2.70E-04 -2.10E-04 -1.30E-03 
 [-0.09] [0.84] [-0.02] [-0.09] 
sample full full full w/o OECD Lat. Am & 
Caribbean 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.15 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.47 
weak instr. F-test 44.23 40.28 29.51 26.67 26.67 
Wu Hausman 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.13 
Sargan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
#obs 1096 653 617 363 170 
periods (max) 12 11 11 11 11 
countries 113 79 79 51 21 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects for 1-year intervals. Stars denote significance at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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Annex 4: Instrumented (2nd Step) Regression: Effect of US Deportations of Convicts on 
Origin Countries’ Homicide Rates (UNOC data, 3-year intervals) 
  
homicide rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
deportation rate (convicts) 0.26*** 0.14 0.1 0.15 0.23*** 
[3.04] [1.41] [0.98] [1.45] [4.1] 
deportation rate (non conv.)   -0.079*   
  [-1.85]   
civil war (=1)  -4.5 -4.2 -3.7  
 [-1.64] [-1.52] [-1.2]  
corruption  0.57 0.92 0.24 0.033 
 [1.01] [1.24] [0.16] [0.01] 
exposure US crime  -0.056 -0.039 -0.11* -0.28*** 
 [-1.38] [-1.05] [-1.82] [-3.41] 
GDP growth  -0.063 -0.075 -0.13 -0.63* 
 [-1.06] [-1.03] [-1.09] [-1.7] 
GDP per capita  -1.1 -2.5 -1.2 2.5 
 [-0.31] [-0.59] [-0.21] [0.17] 
gini (market)  0.38 0.38 0.55 1.5 
 [1.34] [1.26] [1.25] [1.5] 
polity  -0.2 -0.16 -0.079 -0.62 
 [-0.78] [-0.6] [-0.25] [-1.24] 
population (log)  12 8.5 19 160 
 [1.03] [0.68] [1.08] [1.59] 
remittances  -0.77 -1 -0.79 -5*** 
 [-0.92] [-0.98] [-0.82] [-2.85] 
schooling  -0.5 -0.51 -1.2 -2.1 
 [-0.84] [-0.81] [-0.89] [-1.19] 
share population under 14  0.035 -0.33 0.47 9.7*** 
 [0.05] [-0.38] [0.41] [3.27] 
urban  0.47 0.44 0.84 -2.2** 
 [1.43] [1.3] [1.63] [-2.47] 
US arms imports  0.0023 0.0021 0.012 0.041 
 [0.81] [0.7] [0.71] [1.23] 
sample full full full w/o OECD Lat. Am & 
Caribbean 
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
R^2 0.16 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.73 
weak instr. F-test 12.94 14.76 12.74 12.04 12.04 
Wu Hausman 0.48 0.55 0.28 0.32 0.32 
Sargan 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
#obs 351 189 178 107 49 
periods (max) 4 3 3 3 3 
countries 113 72 72 44 18 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-values in parenthesis. All results are based on 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects for 3-year intervals. Stars denote significance at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.  
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